Economic hardship and extreme voting under the economic crisis by Bedock, Camille & Vasilopoulos, Pavlos
 
Revue européenne des sciences sociales
European Journal of Social Sciences 
53-1 | 2015
Les élections européennes de 2014
Economic hardship and extreme voting under the
economic crisis
A comparison between Italy and Greece








Date of publication: 15 May 2015




Camille Bedock and Pavlos Vasilopoulos, « Economic hardship and extreme voting under the
economic crisis », Revue européenne des sciences sociales [Online], 53-1 | 2015, Online since 01
January 2018, connection on 06 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ress/2998  ; DOI :
10.4000/ress.2998 
© Librairie Droz































AND EXTREME VOTING 
UNDER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
a comparison between italy and greece





The theory of economic voting ofers useful insights into the way that the 
economic crisis has afected the electoral behavior of European publics. Economic 
voting theory states that when the economy goes well voters will tend to reward 
the government, while on the contrary when the economy goes bad voters will 
tend to punish the government by supporting the opposition (Lewis‑Beck and 
Stegmaier, 2007). The premises of the economic voting theory have received 
strong support, time and again, across diferent national contexts and election 
types (Anderson, 2000; Nezi, 2012; Fraile and Lewis‑Beck, 2010; Fraile and 
Lewis‑Beck, 2012). Yet the European economic crisis has created the demise of 
not only incumbent parties but in a number of countries has also caused a lands‑
lide for the whole political system, characterized by the shrink of mainstream 
parties and the rise of new populist parties placed on the both ends of the ideo‑
logical spectrum. This was particularly felt in the crisis ridden European South. 
In both Greece and Italy, the economy had profound consequences for the poli‑
tical system that exceed the simple reward‑punishment hypothesis between the 
incumbent and the challenger and apparently turned into a punishment for all 
mainstream parties. This has been illustrated in particular by a drastic redesi‑
gning of the political ofer in both countries over the past ive years, with the 
collapse of both mainstream parties in Greece (Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
[PASOK] and New Democracy [ND]) and the electoral success of the Coalition 
of the radical left (SYRISA) and Golden Dawn in Greece, and the sudden boom 
of the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy in the 2013 general election. This is the 
point where traditional economic voting theory reaches its limits, as it does not 
diferentiate between the type of parties that voters prefer in diferent contexts 
during economic hard times (Kriesi, 2014). 
The aim of this article is twofold. First, by drawing on data from the 
seminal 2014 European Elections, it looks at the impact of the economy on 
the vote for far left and right parties in two South‑European countries, Italy 
and Greece. Second, taking into account the diferential exposure to the crisis 
between the two countries, the article aims to advance some explanations 
about the conditional impact of economic hardship on voting choice. Both 
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Italy and Greece have sufered severely from the European economic crisis 
and both have seen the withering away of mainstream center left and right 
parties and the strengthening of populist parties from both ends of the poli‑
tical spectrum. That said, they also present interesting diferences: whereas in 
Greece, the collapse of the mainstream parties has led to the strengthening 
of extreme parties in both sides of the political spectrum, Italy has not seen 
the development of far right and far left alternatives. Rather, populist alterna‑
tives with strong anti‑politics overtones (M5S) have lourished, while the main 
center‑left party in Italy has shown a relative resilience, and has even witnessed 
a great electoral success in the 2014 European election. Therefore, the far‑left 
and far‑right alternatives appear stronger in Greece than in Italy, and the 2014 
European election in Italy contrasts sharply with the expectation of the econo‑
mic voting theory. As a consequence, the two countries ofer a fertile ground 
to test the existence of a link between hardship and extreme voting. 
1.ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS 
AND VOTING BEHAVIOR AFTER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Bartkowska and Tiemann show that economic voting is a more complex 
phenomenon in the European elections than it is in the national elections. 
Indeed, “the speciic economic policy domains of European Union (EU) insti‑
tutions vis-à-vis the national governments are often only vaguely deined so that 
voters have a hard time identifying responsible politicians or speculating on 
the potential diferences an allegedly more competent alternative might make” 
(Bartkowska and Tiemann 2014, p.1). Comparing the 2004 and 2009 elections, 
they show that voters are more inclined to cast an economic vote when they 
consider that the management of the economy is a domain of their respective 
member state. Lobo and Lewis‑Beck (2012) reach similar results comparing 
speciically economic voting in Southern European countries (Spain, Italy, 
Greece and Portugal) and showing that a heightened perception of the econo‑
mic responsibility of the EU reduces the magnitude of economic voting.
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More generally, these authors have relected on the link between the attri‑
bution of responsibility to Europe and national governments and economic 
voting. Furthermore, one of the important premises of the economic voting 
theory is that it is not the personal inancial situation of voters that is decisive 
for the economic vote, but the perception of the national economy (Duch 
and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis‑Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). In the case of Greece, 
analyzing the elections of 2004 and 2009, Nezi (2012) demonstrated that 
retrospective sociotropic evaluations about the economy are associated with 
support for the governing coalition or party even when ideology and party 
identiication are controlled for. Kriesi (2012) has shown conclusively that 
the impact of economic voting is greater in situation of economic recession, 
and that incumbent parties have been particularly severely punished in the 
recent elections. Lewis‑Beck and Nadeau (2012) showed that economic voting 
in Southern Europe (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) is much more 
pronounced that in the rest of the continent. They consider that this result 
suggests that the electorates in these countries hold the governments tightly 
accountable of the economic crisis they face. 
This article goes past traditional perspectives on economic voting. Indeed, 
what we aim to understand is the impact of the evolution of one’s personal 
economic situation on the propensity to cast a vote for an extreme party. In 
other words, the article deals with egocentric evaluations rather than socio‑
tropic evaluations. There are two reasons for this. First, given the extent of 
the economic crisis and the vast deterioration of the standard of living among 
Greeks and Italians, the number of respondents who consider that the economy 
has got better is extremely low. Second, in this context of very bad economic 
times, citizens who consider that the economy has got better are more likely 
to have engaged in a posteriori motivated reasoning processes, i.e. evaluating the 
state of the economy based on their vote choice, rather than vice versa. 
What is however the mechanism that links economic hardship and propen‑
sity to vote for non‑mainstream parties? As Kriesi (2014, p.519) points out, disaf‑
fected voters have several options at hand: turning to established opposition 
parties, nurturing resentment against all mainstream parties, or turning against 
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political parties altogether by abstaining or supporting “anti‑parties”. Therefore, 
one could expect that the economic crisis leads voters not only to punish 
incumbents, but also to be more prone to support radical political alternatives. 
We consider here vote for far‑right and far‑left parties as a “proxy” expressing 
resentment against all mainstream parties. We exclude the vote for populist 
parties such as the M5S in Italy, due to its lack of institutionalization and ambi‑
guous ideological proile (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013). Moreover, we do not 
analyze actual votes but rather propensity to vote scores, i.e. asking respondents 
how likely it is that they will ever vote for the party in question. Propensity to 
vote (PTV) scores are valid measures of present electoral utilities of each politi‑
cal party (Van der Eijk et al., 2006). Contrary to multinomial logit models with a 
nominal dependent variable consisting of parties with a large number of voters, 
PTV scores ofer the advantage of observing the electoral utility of each party 
without having to exclude minor parties from the analysis. This is particularly 
useful for our current analysis as there is increased party fragmentation in both 
countries. In particular, seven parties in both Italy and Greece gathered a vote 
share of over three percent in the 2014 European election. 
2.THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN ITALY
The 2014 European elections represent a tremendous success for Matteo 
Renzi, who has secured a very large and widely unexpected electoral victory, 
with 40.8% of the votes, the largest share ever won by a centre‑left party in Italy. 
As a consequence, the Democratic Party (PD) now constitutes the largest group 
of MEPs in the European Parliament. According to D’Alimonte (2014, p.99), 
this success can be attributed to two factors: the ability of bringing to the 
polls the voters who had chosen the PD in 2013, and the enlargement of the 
consensus, with the PD gaining 2.5 million voters while the electoral turnout 
declined sharply compared to the 2013 general election. The only other party 
who has gained votes in absolute terms is the far right Northern League (LN), 
which managed to secure 300 000 votes in addition to the ones received in 
2013, increasing by 2.3 percentage points the result of 2013. The M5S, despite 
a decline compared to the 2013 elections, still achieved to obtain 21.2% of 
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the votes, while Forza Italia achieved 17% of the votes. The LN has obtained 
6.2% of the votes nationally, while the list “Other Europe with Tsipras” led by 
Left, Ecology, Freedom (SEL) and allied with the Communist Refoundation 
and other small parties, obtained 4% of the votes. Finally, the junior partner 
in government of the Democratic Party, the New‑Center Right (NCD), a splin‑
ter from the former People of Freedom (PDL), allied with the centrists of the 
Union of the Center (UDC), managed by a small margin to gain representation 
in the European Parliament by overcoming the 4% threshold. 
In one word, the 2014 European election is a clear test for the tradi‑
tional assumptions of the economic voting theory, according to which the 
governing parties are disadvantaged in times of economic crisis, particularly 
so during second‑order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk and 
Franklin, 1996). Hix and Marsh (2007), working speciically on the European 
elections also conirmed the explanatory power of the second‑order model, 
showing that voters primarily use the European elections to punish incum‑
bents. Nevertheless, the efects of the economic crisis in Italy on voting appear 
ambivalent, which may be explained by the inherent volatility of the Italian 
party system since 1993, which been labeled as a process of deinstitutiona‑
lization by Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2014). These surprising results are 
due in great part to the change of leadership of the PD. In November 2013, 
Renzi managed to be elected leader with more than 68% of the votes in the 
primaries, gathering 1.6 million voters, before forming his own government 
a couple of months later with the support of the New‑Center Right of Alfano. 
It can be argued that the “honeymoon efect” from which the Renzi govern‑
ment has beneited has clearly counteracted the incumbent punishment efect. 
Moreover, the relationship between economic crisis and the propensity to vote 
for far‑left or far‑right party has not been investigated so far. 
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Table 1. Electoral Results in the 2009 and 2014 European Elections (Italy)
2009 2014 2014-2009
democratic party (pd) 26.12 40.81 +14.69
five star movement (m5s) N/A 21.15 +21.15
the people of freedom (pdl)* 35.26 16.81 -18.45
new center-right (ndc)–union of 
the centre (udc)**
6.51 4.38 -2.13
the other europe (sel+ rc)*** 6.52 4.03 -2.49
italy of values (idv) 8.00 N/A -8.00
northern league (ln) 10.21 6.15 -4.06
Note: entries are percentage. Only parties obtaining more than 4% of the votes are reported. 
*: After the splinter of the People of Freedom, the score of 2014 refers to the score obtained by 
Forza Italia alone. 
**: In 2009, the Union of the Centre ran on its own. The NDC is a splinter of the People of Freedom. 
***: This electoral alliance ran under two lists un 2009: Rifondazione Comunista and Comunisti 
Italiani and Sinistra e libertà).
3.THE 2014 EUROPEAN ELECTION IN GREECE
Table 2. Electoral Results in the 2009 and 2014 European Elections (Greece)
2009 2014 2014-2009
pasok 36.64 8.02* -28.62
new democracy (nd) 32.29 22.72 -9.57
communist party (kke) 8.35 6.11 -2.24
syriza 4.7 26.57 21.87
golden dawn (gd) 0.46 9.39 8.93
the river N/A 6.6 6.6
Note: entries are percentages. *: PASOK ran under the name of Olive. 
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The 2014 European elections in Greece signiied a historical victory for 
the far‑left, as they won their irst ever election in Greek political history. On 
the one hand, SYRIZA managed to gain an unprecedented 26.6% of the votes, 
a result that is almost equivalent to the one obtained in the second Greek 
national election in June 2012 (26.9%). On the other hand, the members 
of the coalition government reached once more historically low electoral 
shares. New Democracy, the major party in the government coalition, obtai‑
ned 22.7% of the vote, a fall of nearly 7% compared to the June 2012 election 
and 10% compared to the 2009 European election. As for PASOK, the once 
ruling party of Greece, the 2014 European election signiied an unpreceden‑
ted 26% loss in the vote share compared to 2009 as the party managed to 
gain only 8% of the national vote. An additional important and worrying 
development is the continuous rise of the neo‑nazi Golden Dawn, which 
managed to secure 9.4% of the vote (6.9% in 2012), despite the fact that the 
party is being prosecuted for forming a criminal gang and that 9 out of 
18 of its MPs are imprisoned ahead of the trial. Finally, it is worth noting 
that to Potami (the River), a new centrist party led by a prominent television 
journalist that ran for the irst time gained 6.6% of the vote while the Greek 
Communist Party’s (KKE) electoral share was 6.1%. 
Overall, and unlike Italy, the electoral results in Greece followed the 
general pattern registered in the rest of Europe: the punishment of the ruling 
parties, albeit in a diferent fashion: whereas in Italy the main government 
party obtained an unexpectedly large electoral victory, the magnitude of the 
withering away of mainstream parties in the case of Greece is cataclysmic. 
On the one hand, the parties of the ruling coalition (PASOK and ND) lost 
in absolute terms 1.2 million votes, reaching new historical lows that were 
unimaginable a few years back. On the other hand, SYRIZA achieved an 
important victory that consolidated the upward electoral tendency that had 
started on the onset of the Greek debt crisis in 2010, bringing the party 
from a feeble 4.60% in the 2009 general election to the gates of governance. 
Which are however the determinants of the Greek far‑left and far‑right votes? 
Further, how is economic hardship associated with the propensity of casting 
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a vote for radical parties? Up until now no work has investigated the rela‑
tionship between economic hardship and the propensity to vote for the far‑
left and far‑right parties in Greece.
4.METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The following analysis is based on the survey “Comparative Electoral 
Dynamics in the European Union in 2014”, coordinated by Nicolas Sauger, 
Renaud Dehousse and Florent Gougou (2015) and ielded in Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. The polls in each country have 
been conducted by the TNS Sofres. The sample size is 1017 for Greece and 
4003 for Italy. Our dependent variable is the propensity to vote score (PTV) 
for the Italian and Greek far left (SEL and SYRIZA) and far right (Northern 
League and Golden Dawn) parties. The variable is an interval ranging from 
0 to 10 tapping the likelihood of ever voting for a particular party. In our 
investigation of the propensity to vote for the far left and far right in Italy 
and Greece, we construct two OLS models. Model 1 includes standard demo‑
graphics (age, gender, education) as well as measures of economic hardship. 
For matters of comparability for the two countries, we have created dummy 
separating respondents holding a university degree and the others, in order 
to control for the efect of high education. In addition, we control for income, 
whether the respondent is currently unemployed, precarious or works 
without a contract. On top of these we add an index of economic hardship 
calculated as the diference between a respondent’s current standard of living 
compared to what it was ive years ago (both measured in 10 point scales): 
Hence, the index ranges from ‑10 to 10, where positive values indicate an 
increase in economic hardship since the beginning of the crisis in 2009. The 
distribution of hardship for Greece and Italy is presented in Figures 1 and 2.
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Figure 1. Level of economic hardship in Greece
Figure 2. Level of economic hardship in in Italy 
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The two graphs suggest that the Greek respondents have the feeling to have 
been more severely struck by the economic crisis than their Italian counter‑
parts. Indeed, in Italy, around 30% of the respondents evaluate their current 
economic situation in the same way as in 2009, whereas 10% consider this 
situation has been improved, and 60% that is has deteriorated to some degree. 
In Greece, only 3% of the respondents consider that their standard of living has 
improved in the last ive years, while only 10% think that this standard is equi‑
valent to what it was ive years ago. Therefore, an overwhelming proportion of 
the Greek respondents (87%) consider that their economic situation has dete‑
riorated in the last ive years. In other words, the matter of economic hardship 
appears as a particularly crucial development, notably in Greece. 
Model 2 uses the same variables as Model 1 with additional controls 
for two key political values associated with the economy, both measured in 
10‑point scale. The irst measures perceived economic threat by immigration 
(“immigration is a threat to our jobs”). This item is key for investigating the 
rise of far right parties. Past research has illustrated that in economic hard 
times, negative attitudes toward immigrants tend to increase as natives in 
times of economic crises are more likely to perceive immigrants as competi‑
tors for scarce resources (Citrin et al., 1997). This inding has been highlighted 
for the current European crisis (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2014). The issue of 
immigration, especially in regard with the prospects for employment for the 
Greeks, has been key for the Golden Dawn, expressed with slogans such as 
“Jobs for Greek workers” or “Every foreign worker creates one unemployed 
Greek”. In addition, the neo‑nazi party was particularly active in working class 
areas with high unemployment rates, by forming trade unions and even physi‑
cally assaulting immigrant workers. The second item taps attitudes toward 
income redistribution (“wealth should be much more redistributed”), a claim 
which is central in the manifestos of both SYRIZA and SEL. For instance, the 
programme of “Other Europe with Tsipras” puts a strong emphasis on the 
creation of a European Plan for Employment to redistribute wealth and jobs to 
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unemployed people across Europe1. The need to increase taxation on higher 
incomes in order to address the growing income inequality after the onset of 
the Greek crisis is the spearhead of SYRIZA’s economic program. 
5. RESULTS
Tables 3 and 4 report the determinants on the propensity to vote for the far left 
and the far right in both countries respectively in the 2014 European election. 
Table 3. The Determinants of the propensity to vote for the far left in Greece and Italy
italy greece
age -0.02*** (0.00) -0.03*** (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
female 0.31*** (0.10) 0.28*** (0.10) 0.24 (0.27) 0.31 (0.26)
high education 0.44*** (0.11) 0.34*** (0.11) -0.14 (0.29) -0.33 (0.28)
income -0.04** (0.02) -0.04* (0.02) -0.06 (0.08) 0.00 (0.08)
unemployed -0.15 (0.17) -0.11 (0.17) 0.01 (0.33) 0.04 (0.32)
precarious -0.32** (0.16) -0.31** (0.15) 0.36 (0.37) 0.37 (0.36)
no contract -0.61*** (0.17) -0.59*** (0.16) -0.32 (0.33) -0.28 (0.32)




0.16*** (0.02) 0.41*** (0.06)
immigrants  
are a threat 
to our jobs
-0.26*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.04)
constant 4.00*** (0.21) 4.41*** (0.29) 3.73*** (0.62) 1.53* (0.79)
observations     3.722 3.696 867 859
r2 0.03   0.11   0.02   0.09  
Note: entries are OLS regression coeficients with their standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1  <http://listatsipras.eu/chi-siamo/i-dieci-punti.html>.
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Table 4. The Determinants of the propensity to vote for the far right in Italy and Greece
italy greece
age -0.01** (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01)
female -0.22** (0.11) -0.16 (0.10) -0.72*** (0.20) -0.58*** (0.19)
high education -0.12 (0.12) -0.06 (0.11) -0.43** (0.22) -0.03 (0.21)
income 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.12* (0.06) 0.10* (0.06)
unemployed 0.31* (0.18) 0.31* (0.16) -0.04 (0.25) -0.07 (0.24)
cdd -0.30* (0.16) -0.31** (0.15) 0.32 (0.28) 0.25 (0.26)
no contract -0.22 (0.17) -0.23 (0.16) -0.00 (0.25) -0.12 (0.24)




-0.32*** (0.02) -0.06 (0.04)
immigrants 
are a threat 
to our jobs
0.30*** (0.02) 0.28*** (0.03)
constant 2.72*** (0.22) 3.30*** (0.29) 2.64*** (0.47) 1.49** (0.58)
observations 3,719 3,692 866 858
r2 0.00   0.15   0.04   0.14  
Note: entries are OLS regression coeficients with their standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Starting with the propensity to vote for the far‑left, our results indicate some 
important divergences between the two parties. It appears that while in Italy far 
left voters have a coherent demographic proile, the same does not apply in the 
case of Greece. In particular, potential SEL voters appear to be younger compa‑
red to the rest of the electorate, a inding that is in alignment with research 
on the far left from other European countries and that highlights the tendency 
of younger voters to vote for libertarian and non mainstream parties (Bowyer 
and Vail, 2011; Vasilopoulos et al., 2014). SEL prospective voters are predomi‑
nantly female, which could perhaps be attributed to the higher dependence of 
women on welfare compared to men (Dolezal, 2010). Furthermore, Italian far 
left prospective voters come from high educational backgrounds. This is not 
surprising given that there is a strong link between education and endorsement 
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of libertarian values (Knutsen, 2004). Overall, these demographic characteris‑
tics are typical of far left voters in other countries (Bowyer and Vail, 2011; 
Vasilopoulos et al., 2014). Moving on to the rest of the independent variables, 
income yields a negative and signiicant coeicient on the propensity to vote for 
the Italian far left, while surprisingly the same is the case with the precarious 
and individuals who work without a contract. Finally, economic hardship has 
a signiicant efect on the propensity to vote for SEL, but in the reverse direc‑
tion as expected: the lower the deterioration of income over the last ive years, 
the higher the propensity to vote for the Italian far left party. This surprising 
result may be linked with the proile of far‑left economic voters in Italy who 
are highly educated and prone to endorse post‑materialist values. Moreover, the 
main party in the far‑left coalition, SEL, has attempted to position itself as a true 
center‑left government party (Bordandini, 2013), before the change of strategy 
of the European elections of 2014 in order to get closer to other communist 
forces such as Communist Refoundation. As a consequence, this could explain 
why this party did not appeal primarily to the “losers” of the economic crisis. 
As regards their Greek counterparts, our results suggest that voters who are 
positively inclined toward SYRIZA carry a mixed demographic proile, which 
is rather atypical of far left voters. In particular, age, gender, income, education 
and professional status all fall short of reaching statistical signiicance. What 
appears as the only signiicant predictor of the propensity to vote for the Greek 
far left is economic hardship, with a higher loss of income since the advent of 
the crisis being associated with a higher propensity to vote for SYRIZA. These 
results are not surprising. It appears that in its transition from a minor fringe 
party to the winner of the 2014 European election SYRIZA attracts a hete‑
rogeneous electorate, with the only common characteristic being signiicant 
income losses since the beginning of the crisis. 
Moving on to the assessment of the attitudinal proile of the Greek and 
Italian far left voters (Model 2) results suggest that in both cases, being for a 
strong redistribution of income is a positive and signiicant predictor of the 
propensity to vote for the far left in both countries, although the relationship 
appears to be stronger for the Greek case. As for economic insecurity due to 
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immigration, it is negatively associated with the propensity to vote for both 
far left parties, and in this case the association is stronger for the case of SEL. 
Overall, our indings suggest that SEL and SYRIZA do not appeal in the same 
way to voters who lost the most during the crisis. In the case of Italy, the percep‑
tion of a higher loss of income during the crisis negatively afects the propen‑
sity to vote the far left, whereas in the case of Greece, economic hardship has 
a positive efect on the propensity to endorse SYRIZA. The main explanation 
one can advance to explain such discrepancy is the existence of strong socio‑
demographic diferences between SEL and SYRIZA voters. Is there any common 
ground between far left and far right prospective voters in the two countries?
Table 2 reports the determinants of the propensity to vote for the far right 
Northern League and the Golden Dawn. Contrary to what we found for far 
left parties, overall indings suggest some demographic similarities in voters’ 
characteristics for the two cases, as both parties appear to appeal to a young 
electorate predominantly consisting of male voters. Yet, at the same time our 
indings indicate some interesting divergences. On the one hand, it appears 
that in Greece the Golden Dawn appeals to voters with a low level of educa‑
tion, coming from higher income classes and who have experienced signiicant 
loss of income during the last ive years. On the other hand, the prospective 
voters of the Northern League appear to come from all income and educational 
classes and are predominantly unemployed, while being in a precarious work 
state yields a negative coeicient on the propensity to vote for the far right. 
Moving on to the assessment of political attitudes, we ind that a common 
theme of the far right in both countries is the beliefs that the immigrants take 
away the jobs of natives. But while Northern League voters appear to endorse 
economic conservative political values, the Golden Dawn voters have a mixed 
economic left‑right proile. Economic hardship does not have a statistically 
signiicant efect on the propensity to vote for the Northern League. This may 
be due to the fact that the ideological proile of the party is not so much based 
on gathering the “losers” of the economic crisis, but rather on the appeal to 
voters holding authoritarian values and on voters of the North claiming for 
more territorial autonomy, while still defending liberal economic alternatives. 
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Several authors have demonstrated the shift of the Northern League voters 
towards the extreme right, with a stronger focus on issues such as immigration 
and European integration. In other words, the Northern League has positioned 
itself in the recent years primarily as an anti‑European, anti‑immigrant party 
(Passarelli, 2013). Finally, it is worth mentioning that the economic hardship 
variable has a strong positive efect on the propensity to vote for the Greek neo‑
nazi party, even after controlling for attitudinal characteristics. All else equal, 
the higher the loss of income since the beginning of the crisis, the higher the 
probability of voting for the Golden Dawn. This inding is not surprising: in 
accordance with its national socialist platform, the Golden Dawn promotes 
radical solutions regarding the economic crisis, which include canceling the 
Greek bail‑out deal, writing of of the majority of the Greek debt and restruc‑
turing the national economy through the expulsion of foreign workers and the 
protection of Greek businesses. In this way, the radical neo‑nazi platform of the 
Gold Dawn managed to appeal to xenophobic layers of the Greek society who 
saw their quality of life vastly deteriorating since the beginning of the crisis.
CONCLUSION
The example of the 2014 European election shows, thanks to the compari‑
son of Greece and Italy, that the impact of economic hardship on the propensity 
to vote for far‑left and far‑right parties difers across political systems. In the 
case of Italy, the degradation of the standard of living does not lead Italian voters 
to be more prone to endorse far‑left or far‑right alternatives. In the case of the 
far‑left, this may be explained by the “post‑materialist” ideological proile of 
the voters, which is associated with an increased sense of economic security. By 
contrast, the severity of the economic crisis in Greece forced SYRIZA to change 
its focus by toning down postmaterialist issues claims as minority rights and 
the protection of the environment, which were central in its pre‑2009 discourse 
to shift to traditional left issues, the most prominent of which being opposi‑
tion against austerity and a radical income redistribution. This in turn helped 
SYRIZA to expand its audience to those who lost the most during the econo‑
mic crisis. This diference between SEL and SYRIZA is highlighted by the fact 
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that, all else equal, attitudes toward economic redistribution are a much better 
predictor of the propensity to vote for the Greek far left compared to attitudes 
toward immigration, while in Italy the pattern is reversed.
In the case of the far‑right, the Northern League in the recent years has 
primarily positioned itself as an anti‑immigrant, anti‑European party rather 
than aiming at appealing to the losers of the economic crisis in Italy. On 
the contrary, even though the Golden Dawn started rising as a single‑issue 
extreme party that focused almost exclusively on the issue of immigration 
(Dinas et al., 2014), gradually it started promoting a scapegoating rhetoric, 
placing emphasis on the supposed negative role of immigration on Greece’s 
economic woes. Consequently the party managed to attract votes from those 
who lost the most during the Greek economic crisis and voters who blamed 
immigrants for increased unemployment.
At a broader level our results point to the conclusion that economic 
voting extends beyond the typical and widely conirmed reward punishment 
hypothesis. In the case of Greece, the crisis caused a landslide for both mains‑
tream parties, PASOK and New Democracy and brought to the fore parties 
from both ends of the political spectrum. As our results suggest, this trend was 
signiicantly inluenced by economic hardship. It appears that in a context of 
severe economic shock and extreme austerity, voters are more prone to voting 
for radical parties. A possible explanation behind these indings is that as the 
crisis deepens and the space for political maneuvers is limited due to the EU 
imposed austerity policies, voters seek for alternatives outside of the political 
mainstream. In the case of Italy, economic hardship has been less severe compa‑
red to Greece, and the far‑left and far‑right parties did not beneit as much as 
their Greek counterparts from electoral shifts coming from voters struck by 
the crisis. Neither SEL nor the Northern League did alter fundamentally their 
ideological proile in order to attract the “losers” of the crisis, contrary to new 
alternatives such as the M5S. The main governing party has proved more resi‑
lient than expected, thanks to a recent change of leadership. Moreover, Italy 
did not participate in a bail‑out program, which in the case of Greece required 
the written promises by both mainstream parties that they will keep imple‑
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menting austerity policies. Overall while it is hard to make predictions over 
the future of the withering away of mainstream parties in crisis hit Europe, 
we anticipate that as the crisis deepens far left and right populist parties will 
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